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In the context of the formation of G-20, the paper points out the absence of reform in 
the global financial architecture (GFA) after the East Asian crisis, and assesses 
factors that can improve the chances of real reform this time. A factual assessment of 
various causes advanced for the global crisis, puts the main responsibility on lax 
regulation. Liquidity created by current account imbalances was tiny compared to 
endogenous amplification of liquidity in the financial sector. Emerging markets 
needed reserves as self-insurance in the face of volatile cross border flows. Even so 
global imbalances increase risk. The paper summarizes the Chimerica debate and the 
blocks that have stalled progress in resolving the issue. It argues that symmetric and 
balanced reform, at individual country and international level, is required to remove 
the blocks. Deeper governance reforms will make it feasible. Potential contributions 
of the G-20 are outlined. It is argued that India is a useful example of flexible but 
managed exchange rates that allowed market deepening and export growth. 
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As our hopes for substantial reform now rest on the G-20 it is sobering to remember 
that a G-20 plus (G22, 1998) was set up after the East Asian crisis also. A large 
number of reform proposals were floated then for the Global Financial Architecture 
(GFA) but only one was implemented—a dilution of the collective action clause in 
international debt contracts so as to allow restructuring of debt even if a minority of 
creditors were unwilling. 
 
In contrast, despite the damage they had suffered in the crisis, Asian countries were 
willing reformers. They wanted to do whatever was necessary to participate fully in 
globalization, which had given them real gains. But while willing to adopt the best 
standards in transparency and in legal and regulatory reform, they wanted more 
transparency for others also in the global financial system. In view of the role of lax 
developed country regulation in the current crisis, the paragraph below is interesting: 
 
Recipient countries, however, would like similar requirements imposed on 
hedge funds, and stricter surveillance not only for emerging markets, but also 
for developed countries and offshore financial centers. Large investors should 
make their movements public. Korean President Kim Dae-jung (2000) 
proposed that a hedge fund monitoring channel be established at an 
appropriate multilateral institution, since ready exchange of information on the 
investment activities of highly leveraged financial institutions (including 
investment banks) would contribute to the stability of international financial 
markets. Current scrutiny and surveillance are not adequate because regulatory 
structures have lagged behind the increasing sophistication of financial 
instruments. Regulators have to find innovative ways to make institutions and 
markets reveal more information (Goyal 2002, pp. 187)   
   4 
Implementing Kim Dae-jung’s and other such requests for improved regulation would 
have saved the world, and financial entities, much damage. Many of the latter would 
still be around
1. Tirole (2002) remarked that if the many potential crises solutions, 
such as bail-in, standstill, that impose minimal costs, have never been applied it must 
be for deeper political reasons. These have to be countered for reform to be possible. 
 
In the absence of meaningful reform in the GFA, and given dangers from volatile and 
poorly regulated capital flows, Asian countries were forced to go in for self-insurance 
through reserve accumulation, and for mutual aid through central bank swap 
arrangements and reserve pooling such as the Chang Mai initiative. These policies 
have helped them survive the current crisis without major damage to their currencies 
or financial sectors. So global imbalances are a direct result of the failure of reform. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II provides a factual assessment of 
different causes advanced for the global crisis. Section III summarizes the Chimerica 
debate on global imbalances, and Section IV assesses the blocks that have stalled 
progress in resolving the issue. Section V analyzes the reform required to remove the 
blocks and the deeper governance reforms that will make it feasible. Section VI 
presents potential contributions of the G-20 and more specifically of India before 
Section VII concludes. 
   
Causes of the Current Crisis 
But there is a view that blames the crisis on these global imbalances, despite clear 
evidence of the overwhelming role played by lax regulation and excessive leverage.  
 
Global imbalances 
Portes (2009) writes that huge cross-border financial flows due to major saving-
investment imbalances put stresses on financial intermediation that even sophisticated 
markets could not cope with. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) argue that the large 
demand for safe US securities—treasuries—to park reserves in, forced US financial 
institutions to leverage and increase their holdings of risky assets. In effect they held 
the toxic waste generated to satisfy world demand for riskless assets. The argument is 
                                                 
1 According to Hedge Fund Research 1,471 hedge funds, nearly 15 percent of the industry, had to close 
in 2008.   5 
incomplete however because there is no regulatory threshold on the leverage ratio. 
Without that it is not possible to discriminate between the hypothesis that an 
unregulated bubble developed, and that of financial stretch to absorb riskless assets. 
Moreover, the reason central banks buy dollar securities is that US financial markets 
are so deep and liquid that their purchases do not disturb markets. There were no signs 
of stretch in US government securities markets themselves
2. They absorbed inflows 
many magnitudes higher than reserves as funds returned to the US, after the Lehman 
Brothers crash.  
 
Numbers (some of them reported in Goyal 2009), help to put these arguments in 
perspective. Notional amounts outstanding in derivatives grew from $100 trillion in 
2002 to $516 in April 2007 (BIS, 2008). Since 2000 the market for mortgage-backed 
securities exceeded that for US treasury notes and bonds. The 33 percent compound 
annual rate of growth in derivatives occurred just over the period regulations were 
relaxed for investment banks. In 2004 the US securities regulator (SEC), relaxed the 
net capital rule or ceiling of twelve times capital on borrowing for investment banks. 
They were allowed to use their own models to determine risk. As a result leverage 
shot up; when Lehman Brothers was allowed to fail its leverage was 30:1 compared to 
15:1 for a commercial bank.    
 
Compared to this growth in derivatives, both the net ownership of US assets by 
foreigners and reserves were trivial. The former grew by about $1.5 trillion in the 
period. Asian reserves were less than $3 trillion, while the US current account deficit 
grew from $200 to $700 billion. These numbers should not disturb a well-regulated, 




Among other causes of the crisis, US monetary accommodation that kept short rates 
very low for extended periods is said to have encouraged excessive risk-taking
3. But 
                                                 
2 Imbalances were widely expected to create a currency crisis—but the crisis originated in US sub-
prime loans. So the need to prove that the cause of the crisis was actually as predicted may be a 
motivator of this research. 
3 Monetary policy is a blunt instrument to act against an asset bubble, and the direct instrument of 
prudential regulation is available. Taylor (2009) argues that US policy rates were cut in 2003 more than   6 
the US monetary establishment again seeks to deflect responsibility to Asia. Bernanke 
(2005) made a famous assertion that Asian over-saving kept long rates low, not US 
monetary policy. But Taylor (2009) points out that this cannot be correct. Global 
savings were actually at a historical low in this period, so high savings could not be 
responsible for low global interest rates. US dissaving overcompensated for Asian 
saving. The volatility of capital flows indicates they were investment not savings 
driven.  
 
Table: Chinese Reserves and Savings of US Households  
  US Personal  Chinese (in billion USD) 
  Savings Ratio  Savings (in 
billion USD) 
Reserves  Investment in 
US treasuries 
1984  11.2  1259.2  17.4   
1994  5.3  997.8  52.9   
1999  2.5  634.2  157.7  54.6* 
2003  2.4  699.5  408.2  135.8 
2005  0.5  129.8  821  243.1 
2008  1.8  770.6  1946.7  767.9 
Note: *gives the figure for M1(January) 2000, in the column other figures are for M1, except M6 for 
2008  




Indeed Krugman (2009) argues Reagan-era legislation in the early eighties removed 
New Deal restrictions on mortgage lending requiring families to put a significant 
down payment for a home. This started the decline in US savings. Tax incentives and 
wealth effects from the real estate bubble the regulatory regime encouraged 
accelerated the fall. The Table shows a steady fall in the US savings ratio from the 
peak level in 1984. The ratio and absolute level of savings had already fallen 
substantially before Chinese investment in US treasuries reached a critical mass. Until 
2008, the Chinese investment was too low even to compensate for the large fall in US 
savings, let alone lower long-term interest rates. After peaking in July 2008, Chinese 
investment in US treasuries began to decline. US monetary policy certainly had no 
need to reduce US interest rates and savings to accommodate Chinese demand for US 
assets. 
     
                                                                                                                                            
required by the prevailing inflation and output slack, in order to compensate for the bursting tech 
bubble. But this stoked a real estate bubble.   Handling bubbles through monetary policy alone can be 
dangerous.   7 
US broad money supply growth averaged about $15 trillion with an annual growth 
rate of about 6 percent, nowhere near the growth in derivatives. Modern financial 
markets have large powers to endogenously create liquidity, and a strong motive to do 
so in good times. Lax regulation magnifies this many times. 
 
Private foreign inflows to emerging markets fell in the period following the East 
Asian crisis, but more than doubled to an annual average of about $ 200 billion over 
2003-06. They peaked at 617.5 billion in 2007
4. US policy interest rates had been held 
at 1 percent over June 2003 to June 2004, and were raised after that. So if low US 
interest rates were driving the flows they should have been highest in 2003-04 not in 
2007, when the federal fund rate peaked at 5.25 percent. Leverage enhanced flows in 
response to profit opportunities.  
 
Even if the reserve imbalances were the tail wagging the dog, they were required as 
self-insurance in response to the excess leverage and resulting capital inflow 
volatility. It follows the ultimate causal factor was the excess leverage. The tail is 
weak in real terms also. The 2009 World Development Report (World Bank) shows 
Asian relative per capita incomes. Compared to US GDP per capita of USD 46,850, 
Chinese was 2360 and Indian 950. Growth rates may be high but they are from a very 
low base. It is unseemly for an elephant to seek to pass responsibility to an ant. 
 
Contrasting Positions: the Chimerica Debate 
Since the US and China are the countries with the largest imbalances, there is a long 
running debate between them. Each emphasizes different factors as responsible for 
imbalances. The US points to the Chinese exchange rate peg to the dollar, while 
China points to large US fiscal deficits, and more recently to the dollar’s position as 
the international reserve currency. The US downplays the cheap imports for its 
consumers, and China downplays the contribution of US deficits to Chinese export 
demand. 
 
                                                 
4Private Capital Flows include direct investment, portfolio investment, and other long- and short-term 
investment flows. The figures are calculated from data available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/tables.pdf   8 
Exchange rates 
The US is keen to force more flexibility in the Chinese exchange rate regime. 
Appreciation of the Chinese currency is seen as essential for correction of current 
account imbalances. And if imbalances are responsible for the collapse of the global 
financial system it follows they must be corrected. But many European countries did 
not run a capital account deficit (Mohan, 2009). Since the Chinese currency was fixed 
to the dollar, as the dollar depreciated against the Euro, so did the Renminbi. So if 
exchange rates drive the current account, imbalances with China should have been 
largest for Europe. 
 
Extreme views would force an appreciation of Asian exchange rates relative to the 
dollar large enough to compensate for lower Asian wages (Woolfolk 2004).  But there 
are limits to the appreciation of exchange rates in populous countries. Appreciation 
requires a rise in real wages, which cannot occur unless surplus labour is absorbed or 
average productivity rises. Without that wages and prices could be bid down to 
convert a nominal depreciation into a real depreciation. If wages tend to be downward 
rigid unemployment would rise. It follows exchange rates cannot bear the entire 
burden of adjustment. Part of the adjustment has to come from rising domestic 
absorption in Asia and reducing fiscal deficits and consumer demand in the US.  
 
Even so, Asia’s keenness to modernize and develop deeper financial markets is 
pushing it towards more flexible exchange rate regimes. And the severe blow to 
export demand will push these countries to turn more to stimulating domestic 
demand. As the Indian case has shown, some flexibility of exchange rates develops 
markets, and is feasible even without full currency convertibility. But a full float has 
to await fully developed markets and reforms in the GFA to mitigate excessive 
volatility of capital flows. A full float was adopted in mature economies after crossing 
a threshold of development, not before. Even a full float, however, will not produce 
sufficient real appreciation to compensate for lower Asian wages.   
 
Therefore adjustment has to be gradual. During this period an attack on the dollar is 
not certain but it is possible. A unique Nash equilibrium requires a collective action 
failure where all Asian countries sell their reserves. This is unlikely. Goyal (2005) 
shows there are multiple Nash equilibria with attack and hold both as possible   9 
outcomes. A coordination failure could result in an attack on the dollar. Since the 
probability of an attack rises under faster dollar depreciation, the current 
strengthening of the dollar makes an attack less likely. The US rapid policy action and 
deep tax base are all strengthening the dollar compared to the Euro, once regarded as 
a possible rival, and there is no other immediate rival for the dollar. European 
countries are themselves in trouble. While the crisis requires an immediate fiscal-
monetary stimulus, in which the US has led the way, focusing on imbalances would 
demand a long-term contraction in countries with large deficits.  
  
The international reserve currency 
The Iraq War has contributed to rising US fiscal deficits. Since the USD is the reserve 
currency, whenever the US has been subject to macroeconomic shocks, the world has 
been forced to share the costs of adjustment. Thus large US deficits during the 
Vietnam War led to dollars held abroad exceeding gold stocks. Fear of an attack on 
the dollar led to Nixon’s unilateral abrogation of gold standard. The world’s 
willingness to hold dollars has encouraged the US to live beyond its means, stoking 
future crises.  
 
A solution would be to develop an international reserve currency. But China’s raising 
of this issue is regarded as threatening. If investment in US securities indeed generates 
toxic wastes, why do they want to hold on to it?  Revealed preference implies a net 
gain for the US from the dollar as the reserve currency
5.  
 
The US needs capital now, but in the long run, encouraging genuine reform of the 
financial system and the development of an international reserve currency should be 
in its enlightened self-interest. The first would reduce the need for reserve 
accumulation for self-insurance; the second ensure reserves are not all held in dollar 
securities. The US can move to a current account surplus since it would no longer 
have to supply the world with dollars.  
 
                                                 
5 One of Hillary Clinton’s first acts as a newly appointed secretary of state was to visit to China in 
2009. There was no mention of the Chinese exchange rate, but a request for the Chinese to continue to 
hold ‘secure’ US treasuries.     10 
Such a change could only occur in the very long term after supporting market and 
payment institutions are developed. For example, for Central Banks to be willing to 
hold the SDR, markets with liquidity rivaling the dollar must be created in SDR 
denominated assets, and the IMF must be empowered to maintain liquidity in SDRs, 
without waiting for permission from 85 percent of its members, thus becoming a true 
International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR). But given that markets are currently 
locked into the dollar, which has a first mover advantage, it will require sustained 
effort and be a long time before such rival depth is created. But a beginning can be 
made by facilitating the holding of some reserves in SDRs, which are safer since they 
are based on a weighted average of currencies.  
 
China has begun moving from long-term to short-term US securities to safeguard the 
value of its holdings against future US inflation raising long rates. It has also begun 
bilateral deals with its trading partners to use the Renminbi rather than the dollar. The 
US should also initiate proactive adjustment to reduce its double deficit vulnerabilities 
and reassure its investors, while maintaining dialogue to ensure adjustment remains 
gradual.    
 
Motivated Misperceptions 
It is unclear whether these contrasting positions are due to cognitive dissonance or to 
a bargaining stance. Blaming the other can arise from either.  It is easier to force the 
one whose guilt is established to take remedial action, helping a bargaining position. 
But since people tend to see their own losses and the gains others have made, they do 
not easily accept blame. These psychological traps have vitiated any progress on 
resolving global imbalances. China and the US have long indulged in a mutual blame 
game. The US debate focused on competition for its industry more than on benefits 
from cheap imports; China neglected the demand US deficits created for its exports 
(Goyal 2005). 
 
Reasoned analysis can help mitigate cognitive dissonance; but it has a chance only if 
bargaining power is even. The absence of the latter created political blocks so serious 
reforms in the GFA were not undertaken after the Asian crisis. Since rational creditors 
would have gained from changes in the GFA that could have reduced the probability 
of a crisis they should have been willing to adopt them. But cognitive dissonance   11 
made them more concerned about the loss itself than the reduction in its probability, 
so that they did not minimize the expected value of crises losses. Moreover, the higher 
bargaining clout of investing nations meant policy makers followed creditors' 
preferences and pushed to protect them in the event of a crisis rather than to reducing 
the probability of crisis (Goyal, 2002). 
 
Dissolving the political blocks 
Financial markets are subject to boom and bust cycles, but a pro-market stance 
enhanced this procyclicality. The system of bonuses, accounting, funding, 
securitization and risk management based on market prices all encouraged risk-taking. 
Why was there such extreme cognitive dissonance about potential risk? Partly it was 
an extreme swing away from government intervention and towards markets. Warning 
voices were shot down. Regulators were regarded as people who do not understand 
markets and tend to blindly forbid activities. Everyone bought into wrong, market 
based models for risk assessment and diversification. Partly it was that the US 
comparative advantage was largely in finance and US greater power, forced support 
for finance driven growth. US business profits coming from the financial sector rose 
from less than 16 percent over 1973-85 to reach 30 percent in the 90s and peaked at 
41 percent in the 2000s (Johnson, 2009).   
 
Therefore current US initiatives in energy, education, infrastructure promise well for a 
more sustainable growth path. The previous US administration had a reputation for 
not listening to disinterested domestic advisors or to foreign opinion. The current 
administration, in a promising start, wants to lead by listening. More balanced global 
power so that financial interests are not predominant will also insure listening.  
Balance of power prevents extreme views from dominating. More attention paid to a 
diversity of views would be good for the international financial system. It could even 
benefit creditors. For example, Indian financial regulation had many anti-cyclical 
features that the US would have done well to emulate. 
 
Even so, a reaction against markets should be avoided now. Progress has to be spiral; 
circular swings are not progress. Regulation should remove the features that 
encourage pro-cyclicality of markets while preserving their energy and innovation.   12 
There is no shortage of reform ideas, but a better power balance, with a broader 
representation of interests, will aid implementation. 
 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) have also suffered from the export slowdown 
and capital outflows post crisis and are keen to see the global revival essential for 
mutual prosperity. Self-insurance has not been complete; it can be done more 
efficiently. Reforms of the GFA and deepening of domestic financial markets would 
reduce the costs of global integration for EMEs. These costs include sudden stops in 
inflows and widening of spreads on foreign currency loans. Lane (2009) makes the 
point that developing domestic markets for laying-off currency risk can encourage 
international loans in domestic currency, decreasing the impact of currency 
fluctuation on balance sheets of and credit availability for domestic firms.  
 
While blame and pushing leads to resistance, real dialogue is possible to discover 
robust solutions. Communication and explicit coordination is necessary also to 
preempt the scenario where one country sells its dollar reserves because it fears the 
other might do so. Thus discussion can also mitigate fear or tendency to expect the 
worst, which can worsen biases and prevent a reasoned approach to an acceptable 
solution. Discussion becomes necessary to resolve issues, as bargaining power 
becomes more even. Moreover, reforms in standards and tax regimes have to be at a 
global level. An individual country tightening on its own would be subject to capital 
flight. Therefore discussion needs to be institutionalized in permanent expansion of 
the G-7. 
 
Global Governance and Reform 
But just forming the G-20 is not enough. More even power has to percolate through 
the system. There have to be real changes in the governance of the IMF and other 
international institutions, away from the current Western dominance in a structure 
frozen as it was set post-World War II. Political oversight is excessive. The 
membership of the Bank of International Settlement (BIS), and the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB), has been made more representative but pressure has to be kept up for 
more inclusive global governance more generally. The G-20 has come up with a 
comprehensive list of reforms. But most of these rely on the IMF-WB to oversee or 
implement. Therefore reform of those institutions must come first. Otherwise the list   13 
will remain the wish list produced after the East Asian crisis, as financial interests 
regroup and persuade. Even now the US has not been able to restructure banks and 
penalize managements, which is essential for effective resolution of a financial crisis. 
 
Suggestions made to reform the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the Asian 
crisis are still pending. Creditor interests wanted it to focus narrowly on providing 
IIOLR services with strict pre-conditionality. This would require giving the IMF 
power to create resources much as a central bank can, but with backing from world 
governments. Debtor countries, however, suffering from incorrect advice and delayed 
funding, wanted an expanded scope to be accompanied by change in the governance 
structure to reflect current world economic strengths. Moreover, they wanted quicker 
response and more sensitivity to the needs of poor debtor countries, where financial 
interests may not have a large stake. They favoured ex-post conditionality: rewarding 
countries following better policy with better terms to create ownership of reform and 
incentives to implement them. Criticism of IMF functioning led to a demand for the 
creation of an Asian Monetary Fund, which was shot down on the grounds that it 
would lead to a dilution of conditionality.  
 
But stonewalling of reform after the East Asian crisis resulted in many emerging 
market initiatives that have improved the bargaining power of this block, as has the 
post-crisis weakness of mature economies. It is beginning to be recognized that 
credible insurance mechanisms are required for countries to reduce reserve 
accumulation. Suggested reform of the IMF now favours a flexible and fast-
disbursing facility with little or no conditionality for countries adversely affected by 
global shocks. Since March 2009 the IMF has made a new flexible credit line (FCL) 
available, without strings attached, to countries with a track record of sound 
macroeconomic policies and institutions. This has actually been used, unlike earlier 
facilities, since the stigma attached is low.  
 
The IMF has been talking of moving to true multilateralism, rather than just giving a 
larger share in governance to emerging market powers. But to move from the G-7 to 
G-150 is a sure recipe for paralysis of an institution, or to allow continued domination 
of the small group currently in power. Moreover, expansion of resources to service its 
new facilities will require large contributions from the reserve holding countries—and   14 
power must have some relationship to ability to bear responsibility, with balancing of 
bilateral positions from adequate representation of different regions, and of financial 
interests with broader tax payer and consumer interests. Governance design must be 
linked to function. 
 
Large inflows from MNC banks have reversed so East Europe needs resources. Since 
it is Western European banks that are in trouble there, perhaps Europe can be made to 
realize that reducing its current overrepresentation will make more resources available 
with the IMF to lend to it. Tying the reform to removing the current US veto would 
make it even more acceptable to Europe.  
 
India and the G-20  
What is India’s potential position and contribution in this debate? India has a flexible 
exchange rate, and while intervention has resulted in reserve accumulation, the latter 
has clearly been driven by volatile inflows since the country normally has a current 
account deficit, despite healthy export growth. 
 
It has been only indirectly affected by the crisis through fall in trade, inflows to stock 
markets, and foreign financing for firms. Its cautious stand on inflows, with a 
preference for equity over debt inflows, has helped to limit the impact of the crisis. Its 
conservative regulatory stance has also paid off. It has benefited, however, from the 
liberalization process and market development and is committed to it.  
 
Its stance is agreement with the emphasis on stronger regulation, eliminating tax 
havens, maintaining trade, transparency, global standards, and funds for emerging 
markets to fight a crisis not of their making, reached at the G-20 meets.  
 
From the EME perspective, areas of special concern are making the globe safer for 
EMEs to engage with; GFA reforms to reduce inflow volatility; alternatives for self-
insurance; for example, an emerging market fund to stabilize EM bond price or spread 
index;  
funds for infrastructure spending in EMEs to help revive global demand, and 
contribute to development. 
   15 
The G-20 (2009) report on regulation has come out with 25 recommendations 
concerning a national focus on financial stability, oversight of all systematically 
important institutions, countercyclical macro prudential norms, comprehensive 
international standards to be applied consistent with the national context, and micro-
conduct regulation to improve incentives for financial stability. Since there are 
regulatory limitations, improving these incentives is most important. Also prompt 
corrective action can be mandated based on well-defined financial, prudential 
parameters
6.   
 
While the relevant national authorities are to implement, the monitoring responsibility 
is largely on the IMF-WB, except for the last category. Therefore a possible concern 
is whether implementation and monitoring would be effective without governance 
changes. In the past surveillance and oversight of developed countries has been weak. 
A quick possible reform is to make IMF expert reports and warnings independent of 
board approvals. Another concern is the continuing Chimerica stalemate on global 
imbalances. Can the deadlocked dialogue be made effective? 
 
 Since India is not directly involved it could work towards resolutions that improve 
global stability such as more exchange rate flexibility for China and a long-term 
reduction in twin deficits for the US. The Indian example demonstrates some 
flexibility in exchange rates and gradual capital account convertibility is compatible 
with export growth and market development. In recent high-level Chimerica meetings 
the US had not talked of exchange rates and China has agreed that an expansion of US 
deficits is required at the current juncture.  An external push may help ensure 
adjustment does take place. 
  
Pressures for asymmetric adjustment have to be resisted, however. After the East 
Asian crisis EMEs reformed, but developed countries did not. Nor was the GFA 
modified. Today there are pressures for EMEs to allow currency appreciation to 
correct global imbalances, and to stimulate domestic demand, while developed 
countries are to be excused from reducing deficits since they have to fight the crisis. 
Unless their massive liquidity expansion is withdrawn along with revival it could 
                                                 
6 India’s banking regulator, the Reserve Bank, has instituted this since 2002.   16 
flood EME markets where green shoots are appearing. There are also suggestions for 
the WTO to be asymmetrically used to force a revaluation for countries with a balance 
of payment surplus.  
 
After the 70’s collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement on fixed exchange rates, 
countries are free to follow what exchange rate regime they choose; there is no 
enforceable agreement with the IMF. There are suggestions that the WTO’s 
enforcement mechanism could be used to force a revaluation. The argument is there 
are trade and distributional implications of undervalued exchange rates, which are 
equivalent to export subsidies and tariffs, making the issue relevant for the WTO. The 
IMF would continue to assess whether or not an exchange rate is undervalued. But 
bringing in the WTO seriously reduces flexibility. Change at the WTO tends to get 
mired in endless negotiations.  
 
There is asymmetry again since there is no mention of WTO action against 
overvalued exchange rates, due to large temporary foreign inflows. If the WTO is to 
take action against undervaluation it must also be authorized to take action against 
overvaluation. But this would require regulatory action against volatile flows. The 
WTO has is work cut out in fighting against protectionism in a recession; that is the 
urgent issue for it to focus on.    
 
EMEs need to manage their exchange rates. They cannot go for full floats since their 
narrow markets would otherwise be subject to excess volatility aggravated by capital 
movements. Moreover, the real exchange rate has to be relatively depreciated to the 
extent the average real wage is lower in an EME. 
 
Participating in regional initiatives will be useful to maintain global power on an even 
keel; the many Asian groupings can help ensure that more reforms are actually 
implemented this time around.         
 
The G-20 recognizes that while global standards are important they must be sensitive 
to context. Capacity building is especially important for EMEs. This and GFA are 
preconditions for full reform in EMEs. But market deepening is in India’s own 
interest, and some opening can aid this. Markets for long-term finance, such as a   17 
vibrant corporate bond market are required for its massive planned infrastructure 
expansion. Inducement to hedge from two-way movements in the exchange rate, and 
markets for hedging currency risks, can save firms the blows their balance sheets have 
received form the depreciation when an appreciation was widely expected. 
  
But more opening has to be calibrated and is conditional on GFA, better 
macroeconomic variables and market institutions. So India must maintain reserves as 
self-insurance against volatile inflows, and place restrictions on debt compared to 
equity inflows and on full CAC until a satisfactory new GFA is in place and its 
institutions have matured. 
 
Conclusion 
The current crisis has had a major global impact and so may lead to genuine reform of 
the global financial architecture.  But memory is short and inertia sets in once a crisis 
is past. The G-20 must maintain pressure for reform even if the crisis is resolved. It 
has a major role to institutionalize a more even global power balance, between 
countries, regions, finance and the average citizen even while improving the 
effectiveness of global institutions and coordination. Then there is a chance for real 
dialogue to resolve outstanding issues. 
   
Global imbalances were not responsible for the current crisis. Despite being the only 
warning flags commented on prior to the crisis they did not cause it. Even so a 
resolution of imbalances will aid world financial stability, but to have a chance of 
working it must be gradual, symmetric, and fair. 
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